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ABSTRACT Fundamental changes in China’s ﬁnance system for social services have
decentralized responsibilities for provision to lower levels of government and
increased costs to individuals. The more localized, market-oriented approaches to
social service provision, together with rising economic inequalities, raise questions
about access to social services among China’s children. With a multivariate analysis
of three waves of the China Health and Nutrition Survey (1989, 1993 and 1997), this
article investigates two dimensions of children’s social welfare: health care, opera-
tionalized as access to health insurance, and education, operationalized as enrolment
in and progress through school. Three main results emerge. First, analyses do not
suggest an across-the-board decline in access to these child welfare services during
the period under consideration. Overall, insurance rates, enrolment rates and grade-
for-age attainment improved. Secondly, while results underscore the considerable
disadvantages in insurance and education experienced by poorer children in each
wave of the survey, there is no evidence that household socio-economic disparities
systematically widened. Finally, ﬁndings suggest that community resources con-
ditioned the provision of social services, and that dimensions of community level of
development and capacity to ﬁnance public welfare increasingly mattered for some
social services.
Fundamental changes in China’s ﬁnance system for social services have
decentralized responsibilities for provision to lower levels of government
and increased costs to individuals. The more localized, market-oriented
approach to social service provision, together with new economic in-
equalities, has raised concerns about whether barriers to health care and
education for the poor have increased. Medical care costs and school fees
have escalated, while many public services and safety nets have col-
lapsed. In a thoughtful assessment of Chinese social welfare reform in the
1980s, Davis warned of greater inequalities in the quality and quantity of
schooling between urban and rural residents, and between villages of
different income levels.
1 In her appraisal of public health services, she
forecast that both urban and rural residents who could not afford to pay
for care would suffer because state institutions that provided medical
* The authors were supported while conducting this research by a Spencer Research
TrainingGrantawardedtoJenniferAdamsandaNationalAcademyofEducationFellowship
awarded to Emily Hannum. Additional support came from a Faculty Research Innovation
FundgrantfromHarvardUniversityGraduateSchoolofEducation.Anearlierversionofthis
paper was presented at the Columbia University Conference on Education Reform in China
(New York, 7 February 2003).
1. DeborahDavis,“Socialwelfarereform:policiesandoutcomes,”TheChinaQuarterly,
No. 119 (1989), pp. 577–597.
© The China Quarterly, 2005101 Children’s Social Welfare in China, 1989–1997
insurance had disappeared. A decade later, in 1999, Croll’s reappraisal of
the far-reaching and complex consequences of social welfare reform
emphasized two important trends: the increasing dependence on ability to
pay for access to social welfare services, and the rising signiﬁcance of
community-level resources in the provision of social welfare.
2
For China’s children, these trends raise troubling possibilities. In the
1990s, access to preventive health care services for some children may
have been inhibited as costs for those services rose in the wake of
decentralization. Children in poor families, who lacked the ability to pay
for services, and in poor communities, which lacked the ability to
generate funds to subsidize care, may have been particularly hard-hit.
Similarly, rising fees in education meant that the poorest families, and
families in the poorest communities, faced new, potentially prohibitive
economic barriers to obtaining compulsory education for their children.
Yet, just as market reforms facilitated changes in social welfare services,
they also set the stage for dramatic drops in poverty among the Chinese
population.
3 Thus, the rising private share of public welfare costs coin-
cided with economic growth that actually increased many families’
capacity to invest in their children’s welfare. The implications for chil-
dren’s social welfare of rising costs, coupled with new prosperity, have
not been empirically investigated.
This article traces children’s changing access to social welfare services
from 1989 to 1997. For the purpose of these analyses, children’s welfare
services are narrowly deﬁned with one indicator of health care access,
that is, access to health insurance,
4 and two indicators of educational
access, namely enrolment in school and progress through school. Using
these indicators, two questions are addressed. First, what was the level of
access to welfare services in the late 1980s and 1990s, and did the overall
level change? Secondly, to what degree did access hinge on family or
community resources, and did these relationships change?
We set the stage for the analysis with a portrait of health and education
reforms in China. We next provide a brief description of our data, the
1989, 1993 and 1997 waves of the China Health and Nutrition Survey,
and methodological approach. We then present our analyses of children’s
insurance coverage and educational access. These analyses depict access
levels and inequalities for each year, using descriptive ﬁgures and multi-
level analyses of the links between welfare outcomes and household and
community economic resources. We also test for changes in access and
inequality over time, using a generalized estimating equation approach.
The article concludes with a synthesis of ﬁndings and a discussion of
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their implications for understanding the condition of children’s social
welfare in China.
Children and Welfare Reform in China
Many of the challenges in providing public health and education
services for children are linked to larger initiatives to reform the govern-
ment’s ﬁscal system.
5 Market competition has eroded the proﬁtability of
state-owned enterprises, and the government has struggled to establish an
effective taxation system to replace the lost revenues previously provided
by those enterprises.
6 To provide stronger incentives for local government
leaders to generate more revenue and to shed their own expenditure
responsibilities, the government at all administrative levels has decentral-
ized expenditure responsibilities as well as claims on revenue.
7 This
change has reduced resource transfers from richer to poorer regions,
increasing inequities in public spending,
8 and ultimately shifting the
burden of social welfare costs to families and communities.
Importantly, these policy shifts have coincided with dramatic increases
in regional inequality. Inter-provincial income inequality increased
markedly from the late 1980s to at least the mid-1990s, and the urban–
rural gap in income and living standards remained large, by some
estimates wider than anywhere in the developing world.
9 With this
broader context in mind, we discuss important changes in the health and
education sectors that have emerged in reform-era China.
Health. On the eve of market reforms, public health institutions were
ﬁnanced by the government, and public health services were provided to
users at little or no cost.
10 By 1975, insurance coverage provided by the
government, state enterprises and the rural co-operative medical system
had reached close to 90 per cent of the population.
11 This coverage
included almost all of the urban population and 85 per cent of the rural
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population. It provided access to both cost-effective preventive and
curative health care services.
12
With market reforms, ﬁscal decentralization and the diminishing role
of rural collectives resulted in an increasing private share in health
expenditures.
13 The co-operative medical system (hezuo yiliao), no longer
supported by collective farming income, disintegrated, leaving the ma-
jority of rural residents without medical insurance. In urban areas, the
breakdown of the state-owned enterprise system left many uninsured.
14 At
the same time, the state reduced public funds channelled to health care
and encouraged public health institutions to see themselves as economic
bodies and to operate on a fee-for-service basis.
15 Rural health stations
that once provided free medical care were transformed into fee-for-ser-
vice health clinics. In this way, the ﬁnancing gap that resulted from the
reform was ﬁlled mainly by private out-of-pocket spending.
16
In the 1990s, some evidence suggests that an increased reliance on
individual resources resulted in growing inequities in access to health.
Preventive health care services declined as costs for those services rose,
and immunization rates dropped as fees increased.
17 Throughout the
1990s, levels of insurance coverage were low. One study suggests that
the overall insurance rate dropped from 26 per cent in 1989 to 23 per cent
in 1997.
18 Moreover, research indicates that the uninsured are less likely
to seek medical care,
19 experience shorter hospital stays and receive less
medication and treatment compared with those who have insurance.
20
Similarly, research links insurance status to both the probability of
seeking medical attention and selection of a medical provider. The
insured are more likely to seek care when ill, and they are more likely to
seek higher quality health services.
21 The implications of these changes
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for China’s children are unclear. To our knowledge, studies of access to
insurance among children do not exist.
22
Education. Many of the reform-era changes in the health sector have
parallels in the education sector. The transition to a market-oriented
economy was clearly reﬂected in educational reforms aimed at efﬁciently
producing an appropriately skilled labour force.
23 Policy reforms revolved
around perceptions that educational quality was a serious problem at all
levels, vocational and technical training were insufﬁcient, and central
administration of education was too rigid.
24 A complex hierarchy of
programmes varying in length, quality, curriculum and ﬁnancial base
supplanted the egalitarian educational system of the 1970s. A major
component of market-era educational reforms was the decentralization
of the administration and ﬁnance of primary, secondary and tertiary
education.
Decentralization (fen quan) had a profound, exacerbating impact on
variation in public educational expenditures.
25 Through the 1980s and
1990s, provincial and county economic indicators were closely linked to
educational investments, per-pupil spending and school availability.
26
Even within provinces and counties, case studies have established large
differences in educational expenditures.
27 Currently, the central govern-
ment runs and ﬁnances certain institutions of higher education; more
typically, provincial, county, township and village governments respect-
ively take responsibility for schools at the tertiary, upper secondary,
lower secondary and primary levels.
28
For many poor rural areas, the lack of local government revenues or
subsidies from upper levels of government signiﬁcantly hinders school
functioning.
29 In general, the government budget ﬁnances only teachers’
wages. Other costs must be covered from local resources, either through
specially raised earmarked funds collected from households, collective
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contributions (shehui jizi), school-generated revenues or fees charged
directly to students.
30 For example, in rural Gansu, one of China’s poorest
provinces, about 70 per cent of daily costs such as classroom supplies,
heating and other similar obligations are ﬁnanced from student fees, and
20 per cent are ﬁnanced from school-generated revenue, mostly in richer
villages.
31
Available research from the early 1990s suggests that community
resources signiﬁcantly affected children’s educational opportunities. One
analysis of 1990 census data indicates that county per capita income was
positively correlated with the probability of rural youth’s enrolment in
primary school, middle school and high school, net of family characteris-
tics.
32 Consistent with these results, analysis of data from a national
survey conducted in 1992 indicated that village income signiﬁcantly
predicted rural seven to 14 year-old children’s enrolment status, net of
household socio-economic status.
33 Using survey data from the early to
mid-1990s, another study of 12 to 15 year-olds in eight provinces
indicated that community poverty was a signiﬁcant constraint not only on
enrolment but also on progress through school.
34
Summary. In short, in both the health and education sectors, ﬁnance
changes in the reform period have raised the salience of both individuals’
ability to pay and communities’ ability to generate resources. While these
changes emerged in the context of unprecedented prosperity in China,
they also coincided with rising regional and household income inequali-
ties. The renewed reliance of both the health and education sectors on
local and individual support, taken together with increased economic
inequality, raises important questions about trends in access to health and
education services in the 1990s, and about whether children in poor
families and poor communities were increasingly disadvantaged. We
investigate these questions below.
Data and Methodological Approach
This article employs data from the China Health and Nutrition Survey
(CHNS), a multi-purpose panel study of households that contains detailed
measures of household and community socio-economic status, health,
education and other social indicators. The ﬁrst wave was collected in
30. Ibid.
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34. Jennifer Adams, “Educational opportunity and school ﬁnance reform in China: is the
right to education increasingly dependent on family income and community wealth?” paper
presented at the Annual Meetings of the Comparative and International Education Society,
Washington, DC, March 2001.106 The China Quarterly
1989 by the Chinese Academy of Preventative Medicine and the Institute
of Nutrition and Food Hygiene, in collaboration with the Carolina
Population Center at the University of North Carolina. Subsequent waves
were collected in 1991, 1993, 1997 and 2000. The survey used a
multi-stage, random cluster process to draw a sample from eight geo-
graphically diverse provinces that vary by level of economic develop-
ment, public resources and welfare indicators.
35 Counties in each of these
provinces were stratiﬁed by income, and four counties were randomly
selected from each province. In addition, the provincial capital and a
lower income city were selected. During each wave of the survey,
household heads from approximately 3,600 households were interviewed
about the attributes and activities of all household members.
The analyses employ data from the 1989, 1993 and 1997 waves of the
survey.
36 To improve the comparability of the sample across years, we
limit the analyses presented here to cases drawn from the seven provinces
present in all waves of the survey: Jiangsu, Shandong, Henan, Hubei,
Hunan, Guangxi and Guizhou. We used two subsamples of children
drawn from the larger sample. In the insurance analysis, we used data for
children aged 16 and under in each wave of the survey. In the analyses
of educational outcomes, we used data for children aged 6–16 years old
in each wave of the survey. We linked children to family and community
characteristics. We consider three outcomes: insurance, enrolment and
progress through school. In each wave of the survey, the household
respondents were asked whether each member of the household had
medical insurance or not.
37 The respondents were also asked questions
regarding the education status of each member of the household, which
we used to construct indicators of enrolment and progress through
school.
38
Table 1 shows descriptive statistics for individual and community level
characteristics used in analyses to predict child welfare outcomes. The
durable goods index is used as an indicator of household wealth and
economic status.
39 Because within the age range of our sample, children
35. The provinces surveyed in the 1989, 1991 and 1993 are Liaoning, Jiangsu, Shandong,
Henan, Hubei, Hunan, Guangxi and Guizhou. In 1997 and 2000, Heilongjiang replaced
Liaoning.
36. To date, the 2000 wave is not publicly available. We chose to omit the 1991 wave for
ease of interpretation, in order to have equal time intervals between waves.
37. Medicalinsurancewasdeﬁnedtoincludepublicinsurance,labourinsurance,workunit
insurance, dependent medical insurance, co-operative medical insurance, maternal-child
health insurance and planned immunization insurance.
38. We created an enrolment variable based on the answer to “Are you currently in
school?” To measure progress through school, we used the response to “How many years of
formal education have you completed in a regular school?” and the child’s age to construct
a second variable, expected grade, which measures grade attainment for age.
39. Wecreatedadurablegoodsindextomeasurefamilywealth.Ineachwaveofthesurvey,
householdrespondentswereasked,“Doesyourhouseholdordoanyhouseholdmembersown
the following electrical appliances or other goods?” To reﬂect economic changes over time
in China, several new items were included in the list of choices in the 1993 and 1997 waves.
Regardless of small differences in the lists of items across the different waves, we summed
the ownership of all items in each household, and divided the household into quartiles based
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Table1:DescriptiveStatisticsofCommunityandIndividualCharacter-
isticsInﬂuencingChildWelfareinSevenChineseProvinces,1989,1993
and 1997 (standard deviation)*
Year
Individual data 1989 1993 1997
Community variables
Log community per capita 6.206 6.366 7.438
income (1.536) (1.075) (0.617)
Village enterprise funds for n/a 0.229 0.253
education** (0.420) (0.422)
Village enterprise funds for n/a 0.112 0.113
health** (0.315) (0.316)
Urban 0.266 0.229 0.254
(0.442) (0.420) (0.435)
Individual variables
Family durable goods 3.040 3.730 4.626
index∧ (2.103) (2.507) (2.788)
Gender 0.529 0.529 0.533
(0.499) (0.500) (0.499)
Age 7.820 8.654 9.604
(5.062) (4.547) (4.303)
Number of children Education 2,190 Education 2,328 Education 2,299
Health 3,646 Health 3,445 Health 2,913
Community data
Log community per capita 6.052 6.368 7.491
income (1.867) (1.130) (0.670)
Village enterprise funds n/a 0.210 0.204
for education** (0.414) (0.403)
Village enterprise funds n/a 0.108 0.114
for health** (0.300) (0.335)
Urban 0.342 0.334 0.332
(0.481) (0.474) (0.430)
Number of communities 139 165 168
Notes:
*With the exception of the variable, village enterprise funds for education, these statistics
describethesub-sampleof0–16year-oldsusedtomodeltheprobabilityofbeinginsured.We
used a smaller sub-sample of 6–16 year-olds to predict the probability of being enrolled in
school and being in the expected grade.
**These data were not collected in 1989.
∧In the 1989 wave, the family durable goods index was composed of 10 items. To reﬂect
economicchangesovertimeinChina,threenewitemswereaddedtothelistinthe1993wave,
resulting in an index of 13 items for that year. One additional item was added in the 1997
wave, resulting in an index of 14 items for 1997.
Sources:
CHNS, 1989, 1993, 1997.108 The China Quarterly
are increasingly likely to be in school at young ages then less likely to be
in school at older ages,
40 we include linear and quadratic age effects.
Finally, we incorporate a control for gender, which is coded 0 for female
and 1 for male, because research has indicated gender differences in
enrolment.
41
We included three measures to capture differences in communities:
community income, the amount of funds generated by local village and
township enterprises for health or education, and urban/rural residence.
We used the log of community per capita income to examine the effect
of community ﬁnancial resources.
42 In addition, because previous re-
search speculates that the capacity to raise extra-budgetary revenue
(yusuanwai) locally is an increasingly important determinant of public
welfare,
43 we included a variable measuring the amount of funds gener-
ated by local enterprises to public welfare in the analysis. We use the
funds contributed to health in the insurance analysis and the funds
contributed to education in the analyses of enrolment and progress
through school. The ﬁnancial contributions of village enterprises to public
welfare services were not collected in the 1989 wave. Therefore, through-
out our analyses, we ﬁrst present a series of models without the village
enterprise funding measure, in order to compare across the three waves.
We then present models for the 1993 and the 1997 waves with the
inclusion of the village enterprise funds variables.
44 Finally, we include
urban/rural residence, which we coded 0 for rural and 1 for urban. This
variable is included because research indicates that reforms may have
inﬂuenced the educational experience of urban and rural children in
40. Adams, “Educational opportunity and school ﬁnance reform in China.”
41. Emily Hannum and Yu Xie, “Trends in educational gender inequality in China:
1949–1985,” Research in Social Stratiﬁcation and Mobility, No. 13 (1994), pp. 73–98;
Montgomery Broaded and Chongshun Liu, “Family background, gender, and educational
attainment in urban China,” The China Quarterly, No. 145 (1996), pp. 53–86.
42. One weakness of the data is that community income is missing for approximately
one-third of the cases in each year. Accordingly, we used several variables from the
communitysurveytoimputecommunitypercapitaincome.Weanalysedtheresultsinseveral
ways. First, the R
2 statistics from the 1989, 1993 and 1997 regressions were .883, .858
and .913 respectively, indicating that the variables included in the regression explain more
than 85% of the variation in community income. Given the relatively high R
2 statistic, we
decided that using the imputed values would result in estimates that were less biased than
either excluding the cases with missing data or using the mean value of community income
to replace the missing values. Next, we re-estimated our ﬁnal models to examine whether
the cases where we imputed community income were systemically different from the other
cases. These estimates were not signiﬁcantly different from the models presented in this
article.
43. West and Wong, “Fiscal decentralization and growing regional disparity in
rural China,” pp. 70–85; Mun Tsang, “Financial reform of basic education in China,”
pp. 423–444.
44. In China, village and township enterprises are generally considered a rural
phenomenon. However, in the CHNS survey, urban communities were also asked about
whether “village, township, country or neighbourhood” enterprises contributed funds to
public welfare services, such as health and education. In this way, the term village enterprise
is used broadly in these analyses, referring to community-based enterprises as well as
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different ways.
45 Similarly, the impact of health reforms may vary by
urban and rural residence.
The analysis proceeds in two parts. First, we provide a portrait of
access and inequality in the three waves of the survey, using a multi-level
analysis of the links between family and community resources and
children’s welfare outcomes in each survey year.
46 This approach allows
us to separate and identify speciﬁc family and community factors that can
be statistically linked to child welfare outcomes. However, we are not
able to make direct statements about changes over time in levels of access
or determinants of access based on these models. Accordingly, in the
second portion of the analyses, we use a generalized estimating equation
approach to ﬁt models that test changes over time in both levels and
inequalities in children’s social welfare.
47
Analysis
Description of welfare outcomes by year. Figure 1 presents the percent-
age of children insured, enrolled and in the expected grade in each survey
year. Perhaps surprisingly, Figure 1 does not suggest a downward shift in
the provision of child welfare. For example, 79.5 per cent of 6 to 16
year-old children were enrolled in school in the 1989 sample, compared
to 82.4 per cent in the 1993 sample and 90.7 in the 1997 sample. In 1989,
86.6 per cent of children were in the appropriate grade-for-age, while the
ﬁgure was 88.0 per cent in 1993 and 92.2 per cent in 1997. Although
there is little ﬂuctuation in insurance rates among the under-17 cohorts in
each wave of the survey, a slightly greater percentage of children are
insured in 1997 compared with 1989 and 1993. In fact, overall access to
social services appears to improve for children during this period. While
these descriptive patterns provide a broad picture of levels of access, the
results are susceptible to sampling error. Furthermore, these trends do not
account for differences in household and community characteristics. The
following section uses multivariate analyses to isolate the determinants of
access to services in each year.
Multivariate analysis of welfare outcomes by year. We begin by
investigating the effects of family and community resources on the
welfare outcomes of children in each year. Tables 2 to 4 present
45. Davis, “Chinese social welfare,” pp. 577–597; World Bank, China Strategies for
Reducing Poverty in the 1990s (Washington, DC: World Bank, 1992); Hannum, “Political
change and the urban-rural gap,” pp. 193–211.
46. We employ a multi-level logit speciﬁcation: Logitij0001Xj02Xj
03Xj10Xij20Xij30Xijuj where the 00 continues to be the average intercept across
the population of communities and 01, 02, 03 … are the mean differences in the outcome
betweenthecommunitiesassociatedwitheachcommunitylevelvariable.10,20,30 … are
the slope coefﬁcients associated with each student level variable. u is a random effect,
representing the common unobserved characteristics that distinguish community j.
47. Weemployalogitspeciﬁcation:Log(E[Yij]/(1E[Yij]))x ij,where,fortheoutcome
Yij, i1, 2, 3, … N and j1, 2, 3 represent the jth outcome for individual i, x ijis a p by 1
vector of predictors for the ith subject at the jth outcome, and  consists of the p regression
parameters of interest.110 The China Quarterly
Figure 1: Trends in Children’s Welfare
Data source:
CHNS, 1989, 1993, 1997
the results of these analyses for insurance, enrolment and expected grade,
respectively, using a parallel structure. Each of these tables presents
multi-level logit models of welfare outcomes in 1989, 1993 and 1997.
48
They ﬁrst present the statistically preferred models excluding consider-
ation of the funding from village and township enterprise measures that
were unavailable for 1989 (models 1–3), and next display the best ﬁtting
models with the inclusion of these variables (models 4–5).
Insurance. Table 2 presents the insurance status results. The results of
the ﬁrst three models suggest that children’s access to insurance is
conditioned by family and community resources. For example, the ﬁtted
odds of a child in the bottom household resource quartile being uninsured
were 2 times those of a child in the top quartile for the 1989 wave, nearly
3 times for the 1993 wave, and almost 2 times for the 1997 wave.
49
Similarly, children who live in wealthier communities are signiﬁcantly
more likely to be insured in each year.
In addition, these results also suggest that certain attributes of com-
munities may be shifting as determinants of child welfare. First, the
coefﬁcient for the log of community per capita income in the 1997
wave reveals the sizeable and signiﬁcant effect that community ﬁnancial
48. In order to make the models comparable over time, we do not always select the
presentedmodelsbasedongoodnessofﬁt.Forexample,thebestﬁttingmodelusingthe1989
dataincludedaninteractionbetweengenderandurbanresidencestatusthatwasnotsigniﬁcant
in the 1993 or 1997 waves. Because the interaction was not especially useful in addressing
our research questions, we have excluded it from Table 4. Similarly, the best ﬁtting model
forthe1997dataincludedaninteractionbetweenurbanresidencestatusandvillagepercapita
income that was not signiﬁcant in 1989 or 1993.
49. The ﬁtted odds that a child is insured is the ratio of the probability of being insured
to the probability of not being insured. Odds(INSURANCE1)P(INSURANCE1)/
1P(INSURANCE1). Odd ratios were calculated by dividing the ﬁtted odds of having
insuranceforchildreninthetopquartilebytheﬁttedoddsofhavinginsuranceforthechildren
in the bottom quartile.111 Children’s Social Welfare in China, 1989–1997
Table 2: Multi-Level Logit Models of Insurance, Children aged 0–16
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
1989 1993 1997 1993 1997
Family durable
goods index
Second quartile 0.003 0.997** 0.190 0.402 0.223
(0.204) (0.283) (0.214) (0.288) (0.229)
Third quartile 0.399 1.172** 0.588* 0.432 0.594*
(0.209) (0.303) (0.228) (0.311) (0.228)
Top quartile 0.736** 1.766** 0.539* 1.192** 0.582*
(wealthiest) (0.227) (0.333) (0.250) (0.334) (0.248)
Gender 0.315* 0.206 0.043 0.184 0.056
(0.129) (0.135) (0.135) (0.135) (0.139)
Age
age in years 0.041 0.132* 0.072 0.153** 0.099
(0.048) (0.056) (0.063) (0.058) (0.066)
age-squared 0.010** 0.004 0.006 0.002 0.008*
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004)
Log community
per capita 0.594** 0.577** 1.084** 0.223 1.298**
income (0.057) (0.119) (0.193) (0.117) (0.300)
Urban 1.829** 0.355 0.210 0.917** 0.201
(0.191) (0.284) (0.245) (0.287) (0.337)
Village enterprise
funds donated 0.208** 1.429**
to health (0.453) (0.359)
Constant 7.446** 5.821** 11.028** 4.430** 12.789**
(0.540) (0.827) (1.497) (0.776) (2.161)
2 Log
likelihood 1891.56 1812.11 1813.81 1820.00 1801.68
Observations 3646 3445 2913 3445 2913
Number of
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resources have on insurance status in 1997. More striking, when we add
the variable that indicates whether a community contributes funds gener-
ated by local enterprises to health care in models 4 and 5, there is
a positive relationship between whether a community donated these
funds to health care and the probability of being insured, controlling for
other individual and community characteristics.
50 The coefﬁcient for the
50. We also add urban-rural residence status, which became a signiﬁcant predictor for the
1993 wave.112 The China Quarterly
variable associated with funds donated by village and township enter-
prises is also large and signiﬁcant in the 1997 wave, illuminating the
inﬂuence of a community’s ability to allocate local funds in the late
1990s. For example, in 1997, when a community did not donate funds
from local enterprises to health care, the probability of a poor child
51
(bottom quartile) who lived in a rural community with average resources
(median community per capita income) being insured was only 4.8 per
cent. For an otherwise comparable child who lived in a community that
contributed funds to health care, the probability of being insured was
17.3 per cent. These results support the hypothesis that the investment of
local funds was importantly linked to health insurance access in the
1990s.
An additional notable ﬁnding is that the log of community per capita
income remains signiﬁcant even when we include funds contributed from
local enterprises in the model. This ﬁnding suggests that community
wealth and funds donated from village and township enterprises each
have their own unique inﬂuence on the probability of being enrolled in
school. Community per capita income continues to be important even
in communities that donate funds from local enterprises to schools.
Similarly, the contribution of funds generated by village and township
enterprises is important in both low and high income communities.
Enrolment. The enrolment results presented in the ﬁrst three models in
Table 3 provide two important ﬁndings. First, when we control for
gender, age and community income, children with greater family re-
sources are signiﬁcantly more likely to be enrolled in school, in each year
of the survey. For both the 1989 and 1993 waves, the ﬁtted odds of a
child in the top family resources quartile being enrolled in school were
approximately 4.5 times the ﬁtted odds of a child in the bottom quartile.
For the 1997 survey, the ﬁtted odds of a child in the top quartile being
enrolled in school were 2.5 times the ﬁtted odds of a child in the bottom
quartile.
Secondly, the results indicate that while community income was not a
signiﬁcant determinant of enrolment for the 1989 wave, it was signiﬁcant
in the 1993 and 1997 waves, net of other variables in the model. In these
waves, children who lived in the wealthiest communities were always
more likely to be enrolled in school, holding other factors constant. For
example, in 1993, the ﬁtted odds of being enrolled in school for a child
who lived in a high-income community (90th percentile) was 1.3 times
the ﬁtted odds for a child who lived in a poor community (10th
percentile). In 1997, the ﬁtted odds of being enrolled in school for a child
living in a high-income community were 2.2 times the ﬁtted odds of a
child in a low-income community.
51. In this example, the child is male and 12 years old. The predicted probability of a
positive outcome is exp(xb)/1exp(xb) … where x is the independent vector of variables,
augmented by 1, and b is the corresponding estimated parameter vector.113 Children’s Social Welfare in China, 1989–1997
Table 3: Multi-level Logit Models of Enrolment, Children aged 6–16
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
1989 1993 1997 1993 1997
Family durable
goods index
Second quartile 0.305 0.442* 0.287 0.441* 0.260
(0.172) (0.177) (0.213) (0.177) (0.213)
Third quartile 0.695** 0.659** 0.855** 0.656** 0.841**
(0.199) (0.200) (0.287) (0.200) (0.287)
Top quartile 1.498** 1.466** 0.897** 1.465** 0.905**
(wealthiest) (0.275) (0.243) (0.290) (0.243) (0.289)
Gender 0.423** 0.313* 0.199 0.313* 0.192
(0.133) (0.129) (0.167) (0.129) (0.167)
Age
age in years 3.204** 2.477** 2.371** 2.477** 2.369**
(0.182) (0.164) (0.231) (0.165) (0.231)
age-squared 0.151** 0.117** 0.113** 0.117** 0.113**
(0.008) (0.007) (0.010) (0.007) (0.010)
Log community
per capita 0.053 0.153* 0.510* 0.147 0.455*
income (0.058) (0.078) (0.200) (0.080) (0.200)
Village enterprise
funds donated 0.072 0.482
to education (0.221) (0.296)
Constant 14.430 11.551** 12.59** 11.533** 12.269**
(0.981) (0.976) (1.929) (0.978) (1.920)
Log likelihood 1622.13 1734.66 1143.39 1734.55 1140.72
Observations 2190 2328 2299 2328 2299
Number of




CHNS 1989, 1993, 1997.
In models 4 and 5, we consider whether a community donated funds
generated by local enterprises to education. In contrast to the ﬁndings
presented in the examination of insurance, the results in model 4 do not
reveal a signiﬁcant relationship between whether or not a community
donates funds generated by village and township enterprises to education
and enrolment in the 1993 wave. However, the results displayed in model
5 reveal a marginally signiﬁcant effect (0.10) of contributing com-
munity funds in the 1997 wave. These results suggest that the contribu-
tion of community funds to local education may be increasingly
important in 1997.114 The China Quarterly
Expected grade. Two key ﬁndings are displayed in Table 4, which
presents the results of the expected grade-for-age results. First, similar to
the ﬁndings for insurance and enrolment, resource constraints are the
household level hinder children’s progress through school. In the 1989
sample, the ﬁtted odds of a wealthy child being the expected grade were
3 times the ﬁtted odds of a poor child being the in the expected grade. For
example, the probability of a rural male who lived in a community with
average community resources was only 75.5 per cent when the child was
poor (bottom quartile), but was 90.6 per cent when the child was from the
Table 4: Multi-level Logit Models of Being in the Expected Grade,
Children aged 6–16
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
1989 1993 1997 1993 1997
Family durable
goods index
Second quartile 0.278 0.623** 0.410 0.622** 0.411
(0.214) (0.212) (0.257) (0.212) (0.257)
Third quartile 0.700** 1.099** 1.153** 1.094** 1.154**
(0.258) (0.259) (0.374) (0.259) (0.374)
Top quartile 1.144** 1.764** 1.318** 1.769** 1.317**
(wealthiest) (0.369) (0.342) (0.425) (0.342) (0.425)
Gender 0.043 0.125 0.368 0.122 0.367
(0.166) (0.163) (0.202) (0.162) (0.202)
Age
age in years 2.001*** 1.677** 2.196** 1.666** 2.196**
(0.409) (0.327) (0.501) (0.328) (0.501)
age-squared 0.064*** 0.057** 0.075** 0.057** 0.075**
(0.016) (0.014) (0.020) (0.014) (0.019)
Log of community
per capita 0.035 0.062 0.624* 0.037 0.631*
income (0.082) (0.119) (0.258) (0.124) (0.264)
Urban 0.871** 0.918** 0.239 0.917** 0.237
(0.302) (0.316) (0.416) (0.316) (0.416)
Village enterprise
funds donated 0.232 0.042
to education (0.272) (0.344)
Constant 16.166** 12.398** 13.164** 12.502** 13.129**
(2.560) (2.095) (3.532) (2.102) (3.543)
Log likelihood 1077.59 1145.97 820.931 1145.24 820.915
Observations 1741 1918 1765 1918 1765
Number of
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wealthiest families (top quartile). Models 2 and 3, which use the 1993 and
1997 samples, illustrate similar relationships between household re-
sources and expected grade status in these years. In 1993, the ﬁtted odds
of a wealthy child being the expected grade were nearly 6 times the ﬁtted
odds of a poor child being the expected grade, holding all other variables
constant. In 1997, the ﬁtted odds of a wealthy child being in the expected
grade were almost 4 times the ﬁtted odds of a poor child. These ﬁndings
indicate that the effect of family resources on access to schooling persists
between 1989 and 1997.
Perhaps most surprising among the results in Table 4, community
resources appear to have little inﬂuence on grade-for-age attainment. In
models 4 and 5, we ﬁnd that after controlling for household poverty, age,
gender and community characteristics, whether or not a community
donates funds generated by local enterprises to education does not
inﬂuence grade-for-age attainment. Similarly, the log of community per
capita income is not a signiﬁcant predictor in the 1989 or 1993 waves,
controlling for household resources, gender, age and urban/rural resi-
dence. However, the coefﬁcient on this variable in model 3 indicates that
the income level in a community inﬂuences the probability of a child
being in the expected grade in the 1997 wave. Children who lived in high
income communities were consistently more likely to be in the expected
grade in 1997.
Multivariate analysis of changes in welfare outcomes. The preceding
sections focused on patterns of access and inequality in each year. Results
indicate that access to child welfare services, operationalized as health
insurance, enrolment and progress through school, are shaped, in part, by
resources in the family and community. The results suggest that the effect
of household economic resources on child welfare persists throughout the
period. Moreover, the analyses hint that community economic resources
may be increasingly important determinants of health and educational
access. However, we are only able to speculate about changes over time
without testing for the generalizability of our assumptions. Has the
overall level of access to children’s welfare services changed? Have
disparities between children from poor and wealthy families increased in
post-reform China? Do community economic resources matter more?
Here, building on the models developed to predict welfare outcomes
speciﬁcally for each year, we investigate these questions by estimating
cross-wave models to provide statistical tests of changes in both access
and the determinants of access across the three data points.
Table 5 displays the results of cross-wave analyses predicting in-
surance, enrolment and progress through school as a function of family
and community characteristics. We display three models for each out-
come. First, to provide a statistical test of the descriptive ﬁndings in
Figure 1, we present a year-only model, which tests whether the overall
access level to welfare services changed during this period. Next, we
show a main effects model, which presents the effect of family and
community predictors after controlling for the other variables listed in the116 The China Quarterly
Table 5: Population-averaged Panel Data Models of Child Welfare
Outcomes
Insurance∧ Enroll∧∧ Expected Grade∧∧∧
Main Main Main
Year effect Interaction Year effect Interaction Year effect Interaction
model model model model model model model model model
Year
1993 0.032 0.131** 1.876** 0.201** 0.041* 0.505 0.032 0.020 0.814
(0.058) (0.064) (0.535) (0.077) (0.110) (0.451) (0.093) (0.102) (0.635)
1997 0.167** 0.071 1.628* 0.941** 0.756** 1.750 0.432** 0.647** 2.161*
(0.060) (0.076) (0.672) (0.090) (0.115) (1.007) (1.03) (0.123) (1.082)
Family durable
goods index
Second quartile 0.190* 0.187 0.268** 0.284 0.504** 0.333
(0.086) (0.131) (0.093) (0.144) (0.107) (0.176)
Third quartile 0.542** 0.337** 0.632** 0.613** 1.000** 0.743**
(0.090) (0.128) (0.109) (0.164) (0.134) (0.210)
Top quartile 1.119** 1.140** 1.267** 1.278** 1.560** 1.108**
(wealthiest) (0.093) (0.138) (0.136) (0.223) (0.178) (0.297)
Log community
per capita 0.257** 0.194** 0.079* 0.036 0.040 0.032




1993*second 0.952** 0.080 0.302
quartile (0.238) (0.213) (0.250)
1993*third 0.778** 0.029 0.343
quartile (0.233) (0.238) (0.295)
1993*top 0.661** 0.206 0.741
quartile (0.235) (0.305) (0.392)
1997*second 0.575** 0.145 0.187
quartile (0.190) (0.235) (0.261)
1997*third 0.181 0.122 0.444
quartile (0.194) (0.302) (0.353)
1997*top 0.391* 0.318 0.383
quartile (0.193) (0.336) (0.424)
1993*log
community per 0.157* 0.086 0.094
capita income (0.080) (0.069) (0.100)
1997*log
community per 0.205* 0.370** 0.373*
capita income (0.092) (0.140) (0.152)
Constant 1.635** 3.797** 2.873** 1.348** 11.540**11.222** 1.927** 12.854** 13.501**
(0.044) (0.228) (0.275) (0.053) (0.530) (0.554) (0.071) (1.206) (1.242)
Observations 9996 9996 9996 6816 6816 6816 5744 5744 5744
Number of
groups 5524 5524 5524 4407 4407 4407 3928 3928 3928
Notes:
p.10, *p.05, **p.01
∧ Controls for gender and urban included, but not displayed
∧∧Controls for gender and age included, but not displayed
∧∧∧Controls for urban, gender and age included, but not displayed
Sources:
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main effects models. Finally, we present an interaction model, which
includes interactions between each of the years and the family and
community resource variables, to test for changes in the effects of these
factors on child welfare.
An examination of the year-only models for each of the outcomes
highlights a striking ﬁnding: health and educational indicators of child
welfare improved over time. Children are more likely to be insured,
enrolled in school and in the appropriate grade for age in 1997 when
compared with 1989. In the main effects models, we include measures of
family wealth, community wealth and other demographic controls. Sev-
eral important ﬁndings emerge. First, when we control for demographic
features, family wealth and several community characteristics, the edu-
cation outcomes continue to indicate improvement between 1989 and
1997. However, when we hold family and community wealth constant,
access to insurance declines between 1989 and 1993, but the probability
of being insured in 1997 is not signiﬁcantly different from 1989. This
suggests that while access to insurance is rising overall, the increase may
be attributed to improvements in family and community circumstances.
Furthermore, the results in Table 5 indicate that children from poor
families are signiﬁcantly disadvantaged in health and education in each
wave of the survey, while children who live in ﬁnancially-constrained
communities are disadvantaged in health and enrolment.
We now turn to the interaction models to examine whether the
relationships between family and community resources and each indicator
of child welfare have changed over time. The coefﬁcients on the interac-
tion terms for year-by-durable goods indicate that the relationship be-
tween family wealth and the probability of being insured is stronger in the
1993 wave than in the 1989 wave.
52 Similarly, the interaction terms for
year-by-community per capita income suggest that community wealth is
more important for insurance in both 1993 and 1997 than in 1989. In
education, the interaction terms suggest that the strength of family
resources as determinants of educational outcomes has not changed
during this period. However, the effect of community per capita income
on enrolment and expected grade is signiﬁcantly larger in the 1997 wave,
suggesting that community wealth may play an increasingly important
role in education in the later 1990s.
The models presented in Table 6 include a variable indicating whether
a community donated funds from the local village and township enter-
prises to health or education. Like the models presented in Table 5, we
include three models for each child welfare outcome. We are most
interested in the main effect and interaction models. The main effects
models suggest that the contribution of local funds generated by village
and township enterprises to public welfare is a signiﬁcant determinant of
52. An examination of the year by durable goods index interaction for the 1997 wave
reveals that children in the wealthiest families (top quartile) are less likely to have insurance
than children from the poorest families. One explanation for this ﬁnding is that wealthy
families, entrepreneurs etc. are opting out of insurance and choosing to pay for their own
medical care.118 The China Quarterly
Table 6: Population-averaged Panel Data Models of Child Welfare
Outcomes
Insurance∧ Enrol∧∧ Expected Grade∧∧∧
Main Main Main
Year effect Interaction Year effect Interaction Year effect Interaction
model model model model model model model model model
Year
1997 0.207** 0.114 1.328 0.769** 0.653** 0.909 0.265** 0.527** 1.582
(0.059) (0.087) (0.829) (0.092) (0.115) (1.028) (0.094) (0.131) (1.134)
Family Durable
Goods Index
Second quartile 0.408** 0.715** 0.263* 0.369* 0.580** 0.617**
(0.118) (0.206) (0.118) (0.154) (0.135) (0.182)
Third quartile 0.650** 1.094** 0.617** 0.618** 1.104** 1.042**
(0.123) (0.206) (0.138) (0.170) (0.175) (0.220)
Top quartile 1.233** 1.927** 1.269** 1.459** 1.751** 1.837**
(0.122) (0.207) (0.159) (0.209) (0.225) (0.301)
Log community
per capita 0.379** 0.438** 0.138** 0.114* 0.109 0.042
Income (0.060) (0.083) (0.051) (0.058) (0.069) (0.089)
Village enterprise
funds donated
to health or 0.722** 0.183 0.204 0.039 0.088 0.186




1997*second 0.411 0.285 0.067
quartile (0.244) (0.241) (0.257)
1997*third 0.652** 0.078 0.151
quartile (0.248) (0.305) (0.348)
1997*top 1.131** 0.545 0.262
quartile (0.242) (0.325) (0.422)
1997*Log
community per 0.119 0.227 0.316
capita income (0.119) (0.146) (0.166)
1997*VTE fund
donated to
village health 1.012** 0.444 0.217
or education (0.186) (0.255) (0.276)
Constant 1.670** 4.328** 5.092 1.534** 10.502**10.372** 2.096** 11.463** 11.954**
(0.046) (0.404) (0.566) (0.054) (0.703) (0.719) (0.072) (1.424) (1.470)
Observations 6353 6353 6353 4626 4626 4626 4003 4003 4003
Number of
groups 4284 4284 4284 3420 3420 3420 3071 3071 3071
Notes:
p.10, *p.05, **p.01
∧ Control for urban, gender and age included, but not displayed
∧∧Controls for gender and age included, but not displayed
Sources:
CHNS, 1993, 1997.
insurance and a marginally signiﬁcant determinant of enrolment out-
comes (p.10), controlling for demographic features, family wealth and
other community characteristics. Furthermore, a signiﬁcant interaction in
the insurance model suggests that the contribution of local funds to local119 Children’s Social Welfare in China, 1989–1997
health was more important in the 1997 wave. Likewise, the marginally
signiﬁcant interaction in the enrolment model hints that the contribution
of these funds to local schools may also be increasingly relevant. These
ﬁndings suggest that the importance of local ﬁnancing increased in the
later 1990s.
Discussion and Conclusions
More than two decades have passed since the Chinese government
began their ambitious plan to bring China into the market. By a number
of measures, market reforms have been successful. China has a developed
a rapidly growing economy and living standards have improved for most
Chinese citizens. At the same time, changes in the ﬁnance of social
services, characterized by a rising dependence on the ability to pay for
services, have affected children’s opportunities to attend school and to
seek health care when sick. While scholars have raised important ques-
tions about social welfare access and inequality in this period, no research
has sought to understand the experiences of children in the wake of
market reforms. This article begins to ﬁll the gap, by shifting attention to
children. The results present a complex picture of social welfare access
for children and its changes in the 1990s.
Our analysis of children’s access to health and education services
yields three notable results. First, contrary to prevailing beliefs, our
results refute the notion of an across-the-board decline in the provision of
child welfare services. Descriptive ﬁgures actually suggest improvements
in welfare indicators. During this period, levels of school enrolment and
grade-for-age attainment were relatively high, ranging from roughly 80 to
90 per cent. Moreover, the probability of being enrolled in school and
being in the appropriate grade-for-age increased between 1989 and 1997,
even when we controlled for family wealth, community per capita
income, urban-rural residence, age and gender. However, our results
regarding access to insurance reveal that while overall access to insurance
has increased during this period, these gains do not persist when we
controlled for individual and community characteristics. Children were
less likely to be insured in 1993 compared with 1989 when we accounted
for family and community resources. Children’s access to insurance in
1997 was not signiﬁcantly different from 1989, suggesting that gains in
access to insurance were made between 1993 and 1997. Nevertheless,
children’s access to insurance remains strikingly low; less than 20 per
cent of children were insured in 1997.
Secondly, analyses highlight the signiﬁcant disadvantages in insurance
and education experienced by children from poor families in each wave
of the survey. Throughout the period, poor children had substantially
lower chances of having health insurance, being enrolled and being in an
age-appropriate grade than their wealthier counterparts. In 1997, only 10
per cent of poor children were insured, compared with nearly 30 per cent
of children from wealthy families. The enrolment gap and expected
grade-for-age gap between poor and wealthy children were 8.3 and 13.3120 The China Quarterly
percentage points, respectively. While these disparities endure throughout
the period, the gaps in access to schooling between rich and poor
households did not systematically widen. Results are more equivocal for
insurance. Multivariate results did indicate that household socio-econ-
omic status was more important for insurance in 1993 than in 1989, but
they also showed that effect of household socio-economic status was not
signiﬁcantly different in 1997 from 1989. These ﬁndings may reﬂect the
behaviour of China’s wealthier families, who are opting out of insurance
schemes and instead choosing to pay for their own medical services.
Finally, we see clear evidence that communities play a fundamental
role in the provision of social services. Even more striking, the import-
ance of community ﬁnancing has increased during this period for some
welfare services. Resource constraints at the community level were
barriers to health insurance in each of the survey years and to education
in 1993 and 1997. Children who lived in wealthier villages were always
more likely to be insured, enrolled in school and in the expected grade
when compared with their counterparts in resource-poor communities.
Furthermore, children who lived in communities that devoted funds from
local enterprises to public health were more likely to be insured. In the
cross-wave analysis, the effect of community per capita income on
insurance status was stronger in both 1993 and 1997 compared with 1989.
Similarly, whether communities devoted funds from village and township
enterprises to health mattered more for insurance in 1997 than in 1993.
In the cross-wave analysis of enrolment and expected grade, community
per capita income also mattered more in 1997 than in 1989. Marginally
signiﬁcant results suggest that children in communities that were able to
devote funding from local enterprises to education were more likely to be
enrolled in school, and that the advantage may have increased by 1997.
These results resonate with Croll’s concerns about the increasing
relevance of community ability to generate resources in determining
access to social services. The central government’s ceding of responsi-
bility for the provision of social services left local communities with no
choice but to take on new responsibilities for providing basic health and
educational services. In fact, a welfare crisis may have been averted
largely because of the ﬁnancial contributions of communities. Yet, while
many local communities have managed to ﬁll the gap left by the retreat
of the central government, their future success is largely dependent on the
capacity of local economies and the proﬁtability of village enterprises. As
these unpredictable community resources become increasingly relied on,
concern for the children who live in communities that cannot afford to
defray the costs of health care and education is warranted.
In addition, although our study cannot empirically address the issue of
quality of welfare services, decentralization and privatization of costs
imply that the quality of schooling and health care may be increasingly
diverging for rich and poor households and communities, even as access
to the system has expanded. Our ﬁeld visits to several schools and health
care facilities suggest that both the steady marketization of education and
health, combined with a new reliance on non-government and com-121 Children’s Social Welfare in China, 1989–1997
munity resources, has resulted in wide variation in the quality of these
services. For the most part, uninsured children participate in a fee-for-ser-
vice health care system in which patients seek the best quality of care that
they can afford, and sometimes forego preventative health care. United
Nations data, which suggest that immunization rates declined for children
in the 1990s,
53 supports this conclusion. Similarly, in education, the
provision of schooling is primarily ﬁnanced by local communities and
student fees, resulting in a wide range of both school and teacher
quality. In this manner, one of the consequences of decentralization is
wide variation in the quality of important public goods as children’s
welfare services increasingly rely on individual fees and community
contributions.
Finally, it is important to emphasize that the most dire predictions
about growing barriers to children’s health care and education did not
come true in the 1990s. On balance, access to children’s welfare services
improved for all children. However, this accomplishment must be tem-
pered by the social costs of decentralization era reforms: the persistence
of old disparities and the emergence of new forms of inequality. Through-
out the 1990s, children from poor families continue to experience barriers
as they seek health care and schooling. Even more striking, children are
not only disadvantaged by family poverty; in addition, their schooling
and health care experiences are conditioned by community poverty. As a
result, social policy in China will be challenged in the next decade to
reconceptualize health and educational institutions in a way that guaran-
tees access for all children, regardless of where they reside, and also that
ensures quality. In the short term, additional research using direct mea-
sures of services experienced by poor and non-poor children within the
health and education sectors is needed, to clarify broader trends in
children’s social welfare in China.
53. United Nations Millennium Indicators, 2002. China Country Proﬁle, http://
millenniumindicators.un.org/unsd/mi/mi results.asp?crID156.